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PART 1: GENERAL INFORMATION
A. Introduction

The purpose of this Bench Memorandum is to provide judges in the Niagara
Moot Court Competition a summary of the basic factual and legal issues in the
2014 Niagara Problem (the “Compromis”). This Bench Memorandum should be
read in conjunction with the teams’ briefs that you are judging; the Compromis,
which is in essence a stipulation of facts agreed to by the two Parties; and the
Corrections/Clarifications which supplements the Compromis. The Compromis
is intended to present the competitors with a balanced problem, such that each
side has strengths and weaknesses in its case. This Bench Memorandum is not
meant to be an exhaustive treatise on the legal issues raised in the Compromis,
and Judges should not be surprised when, in evaluating either a Brief or an oral
argument, they see arguments or authorities not discussed in this memorandum.
Their absence from this Bench Memorandum does not suggest that such
arguments are not relevant or credible.
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B. Synopsis of the Facts

The 2014 Niagara Moot Court Case concerns two issues: First, whether an
obligation exists under international law to recognize same-sex marriage. And
second, the extent to which a state may assert its right to protect itself from
terrorism by freezing the sale of a yacht where the proceeds were intended to pay
a ransom to pirates.
Sam Chandra and Bill Hayter’s Domestic Partnership
Sam Chandra met Bill Hayter while Sam was studying at Portland State
University in 2005. The two quickly hit it off and moved in together just a few
months after their relationship began. When Chandra graduated from PSU,
Hayter offered him a position as a finance officer with Hayter’s successful home
renovation business, Hayter Homes Ltd. Chandra and Hayter shared living
expenses and divided chores amongst each other at their home. They hiked,
biked, and canoed together, and often hosted a mix of their gay and straight
friends over for dinners and parties. The couple also purchased a 22-foot monohull sailboat, which they named The Oscar Wilde, and they would often spend
their weekends sailing the through the waters of the Columbia River. The Oscar
Wilde was registered and flagged a U.S. vessel.
In March 2007, Hayter proposed to Chandra at a fundraiser for the Portland
Art Museum. The couple went to obtain a marriage license from the Clerk of
Multnomah Country, but were denied based on a 2004 amendment to the Oregon
Constitution. “Measure 36” amended the constitution so that only marriages
between one man and one woman were considered legally recognized. In 2007,
however, the Oregon state legislature passed the Family Fairness Act, which
created the status of “domestic partnership” and granted certain rights to samesex couples who registered under the Act. Chandra and Hayter registered their
relationship under the Act in March 2008. While the Oregon Constitution still
did not recognize same-sex couples as legally wed, those in a domestic
partnership were granted the right to make medical decisions in crises, to
exercise rights and responsibilities related to property and inheritance, and to
benefit from provisions to protect children and other dependents.
Following a downturn in the Oregon economy, Chandra and Hayter
relocated to Vancouver, British Columbia.
The Freeze on the Sale of The Oscar Wilde
In May 2013, Chandra and Hayter were spending the night aboard The
Oscar Wilde in international waters. At some point in the night, Hayter awoke to
investigate a noise and was abducted by masked men who had boarded the ship.
Chandra awoke to find Hayter missing, and immediately contacted the Canadian
Coast Guard to search for him.
Two weeks after Hayter’s disappearance, Chandra received an email from
“Moses Andrew,” an individual who identified himself as a member of the Namian
Liberation Front (NLF). Andrew informed Chandra that Hayter was alive and
healthy, but demanded Chandra pay a U.S. $5 million ransom. The NLF is an
organization working towards the creation of an independent state out of the
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Namian Islands, which is currently part of the Republic of Minasia. In pursuit of
this goal, the NLF has blown up bridges and buildings throughout Minasia and has
been implicated in attacks in the Harjuro, the country’s capital. The organization
has been designated a terrorist organization on lists maintained by Public Safety
Canada and the U.S. State Department. The NLF also maintains close ties with
Somali pirates. The two groups have been known to conduct training and
information exchange sessions together, and have been implicated in joint attacks
on vessels.
In an effort to raise money for the ransom, Chandra set up a web-based
appeal and considered selling The Oscar Wilde. Upon hearing of Chandra’s
fundraising, the U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) froze the sale of
ship and stated that any private efforts to contribute money would be contrary to
international law. OFAC instituted its actions because it believed the ransom
payment and the proceeds from The Oscar Wilde would materially assist
terrorists in contravention to international law. Canada issued a Diplomatic Note
asserting that OFAC’s actions were unwarranted, but the U.S. rejected this,
stating that every country has a right to protect itself from terrorists.
Additionally, Canada issued a Diplomatic Note to the United Stated asserting
that the U.S. had breached international law by failing to issue a marriage license
to Chandra and Hayter. The U.S. responded that every nation has the right to
establish what the pre-conditions for marriage are.
After high-level negotiations in late July 2013 failed, Canada and the United
States agreed in August 2013 to submit the disputes about the marriage licenses
and OFAC’s blocking of The Oscar Wilde to a special chamber of the ICJ. Both
countries further agreed that they would fully and immediately implement
whatever decision the ICJ renders in the case.
C. Sources of International Law

This section is an introduction to public international law for judges who
might not have professional experience or training in the field. Feel free to skip
to Section IV if you have judged International Law Moot Courts in the past
and/or feel that you have a good familiarity with the general principles of
international law. There are important distinctions between international law and
domestic legal systems. The most significant for the international law moot
judge is the rigid definition of what sources of law are acceptable before the
Court.
1. General

The conduct and rules of the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ”) are
governed by the Statute of the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ Statute”).
Under Article 38(1) of its Statute, the International Court of Justice may consider
the following sources of international law in order to decide disputes before it:
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
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c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.
Commentators disagree as to whether these sources are listed in order of
importance.
Judges from common-law systems should note the status of precedent.
Article 59 of the ICJ Statute deprives decisions of the Court any status as
precedent, stating, “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” In practice, however,
the ICJ often cites its prior decisions, and those of its predecessor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice, as persuasive authority, pursuant to Article
38(1)(d). Additionally, the Court frequently evaluates rules of customary
international law in its opinions and subsequently relies upon those evaluations
in later decisions.
Decisions by other tribunals are dealt with in the discussion in Subsection E
(“Decisions and Publicists”) infra.
Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly are not, of themselves,
binding before the Court. Although Resolutions may be evidence of customary
international law, the General Assembly’s position in international law is not
analogous to that of a domestic legislature, and resolutions of the General
Assembly do not create positive international law.
2. Treaties

Treaties are agreements between and among States, by which parties
obligate themselves to act, or refrain from acting, according to the terms of the
treaty. Rules regarding treaty procedure and interpretation are defined in the 1959
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties1 (the “VCLT”), which is accepted by
both the United States and Canada as customary international law.
The fundamental principle relating to treaties, reiterated in Article 26 of the
VCLT, is that of pacta sunt servanda: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” In other words, once
a State becomes a party to a treaty, it is bound by that treaty. Article 27 of the
VCLT provides that a State cannot plead its Constitution, domestic laws, or
domestic court cases as an excuse for non performance of a treaty obligation.
Article 34 of the VCLT adds that a treaty is generally not binding on a State
which is not party to the treaty, and does not create rights or obligations for such
a State. Article 18 tempers this rule with respect to States that have signed – but
not yet ratified – a treaty: “A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it has signed the treaty . . . .”
pending ratification, unless it has “made its intention clear not to become a party
to the treaty.” For example, a State which has signed but not ratified a treaty
forbidding testing of nuclear weapons would not be held to the minute procedural
details of the treaty; however, actual nuclear- weapons testing by the State would
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probably be seen as a violation of international law, constituting a breach of the
“object and purpose” of the treaty.
The treaties potentially relevant to this case, to which both Canada and the
United States are parties, include: the U.N. Charter, the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, and the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions. Note, while
Canada is party to the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), the
U.S. has signed but not yet ratified the 1982 Convention.1
Even if a State is not party to a treaty, a treaty may serve as evidence of
customary international law. Article 38 of the VCLT recognizes this “backdoor” means by which a treaty may become binding on non-parties. Judges
should be aware, however, that situations arise where some provisions of a treaty
– for example, many provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention – may
reflect or codify customary international law, while other parts do not.
3. Customary International Law

The second source of international law is customary international law. A rule
of customary international law is one that, whether or not it has been codified in
a treaty, has binding force of law because the community of States treats it and
views it as a rule of law. In contrast to treaty law, a rule of customary
international law is binding upon a State whether or not it has affirmatively
assented to that rule. The exception to this is that a State which has been “a
persistent objector” to the rule of customary international law will not be bound
by it.
In order to prove that a given rule has become a rule of customary
international law, one must prove two elements: widespread state practice and
opinio juris – the mutual conviction that the recurrence (of state practice) is the
result of a compulsory rule.
“State practice” is the material element of customary international law, and
simply means that a sufficient number of states behave in a regular and repeated
manner consistent with the customary norm. As alluded to above, State practice
may also be shown when a sufficient number of States sign, ratify, and accede to
a convention. There is some dispute among commentators as to whether the
practice of a small number of states in a particular region can create
“regional customary international law” or whether the practice of particularly
affected states, e.g. in the area of space law or antitrust law, can create custom
that binds states which later become affected by these issues, although the ICJ
appears to have acknowledged the possibility. 2
Opinio juris is the psychological or subjective element of customary
international law. It requires that the State action in question be taken out of a
sense of legal obligation, as opposed to mere expediency. Put another way,
opinio juris, is the “conviction of a State that it is following a certain practice as

1

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969), https://treaties.
un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=
mtdsg 3&lang=en [hereinafter VCLT].
2
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 1 (1969).
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a matter of law and that, were it to depart from the practice, some form of
sanction would, or ought to, fall on it.”3
Customary international law is shown by reference to treaties, decisions of
national and international courts, national legislation, diplomatic
correspondence, opinions of national legal advisers, and the practice of
international organizations. Each of these items might be employed as evidence
of State practice, opinio juris, or both.
With respect to the burden of proof, in The North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, the ICJ stated that the party asserting the existence of a rule of
customary international law bears the burden of proving the existence of such a
rule.
4. General Principles of Law

The third source of international law consists of “general principles of law.”
Such principles are gap-filler provisions: on occasion, the ICJ must have
recourse to rules typically found in domestic legal systems in order to address
procedural and other issues.
The bulk of recognized general principles are procedural in nature, for
example, the laws regarding burden of proof and admissibility of circumstantial
evidence. Many other principles, for example estoppel, waiver, unclean hands,
necessity, and force majeure, may sound to a common-law practitioner like
equitable doctrines. The principle of general equity in the interpretation of legal
documents and legal relationships is one of the most widely cited general principles
of international law. The ICJ has upheld the application of equitable principles
generally in, among other cases, the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969).
Its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, recognized
equitable principles as part and parcel of international law in The Diversion of
Water from the Meuse.4
It is important to note, however, that “equity” in this sense is a source of
international law, brought before the Court under Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute
of the ICJ. It is an inter legem application of equitable principles, and not a
power of the Court to decide the merits of the case ex aequo et bono, a separate
matter treated under Article 38(2) of the Statute.
5. Decisions and Publicists

The final source of international law is judicial decisions and teachings of
scholars. This category is described as “a subsidiary means of finding the law.”
Judicial decisions and scholarly writings are, in essence, research aids for the
Court, used for example to support or refute the existence of a customary norm,
to clarify the bounds of a general principle or customary rule, or to demonstrate
state practice under a treaty.
Judicial decisions, whether from international tribunals or from domestic
courts, are useful to the extent they address international law directly or
demonstrate a general principle.
3
4

MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 4 (1985).
1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70, at 76-78.
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“Teachings” refers simply to the writings of learned scholars. Many student
competitors make the mistake of believing that every single published article
constitutes an Article 38(1)(d) “teaching.” However, the provision is expressly
limited to teachings of “the most highly qualified publicists.” For international
law generally, this is a very short list, and includes names like Grotius,
Lauterpacht, and Brownlie. Within the context of a specific field of international
law – for example, environmental law or law of the sea – there are additional
experts who would be regarded within their field as “highly qualified publicists.”
D. Burdens of Proof

In the Corfu Channel Case5, the ICJ set out the burdens of proof applicable to
cases before it. The Applicant (in this case Canada) normally carries the burden
of proof with respect to factual allegations contained in its claim, by a
preponderance of the evidence. In the case of counter- claims (the second issue
in the present case), the Respondent (here the United States) bears the burden of
proof.
Participants cannot, however, be held responsible for the lack of information
in the Compromis. They can only be held responsible for the quality of their
argument in light of the lack of detail. Judges should not dwell on the
evidentiary gaps unless the competitors have themselves drawn implausible or
unsupportable inferences.

PART II: LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. The United States’ Obligation Under International Law to Provide for Same-Sex
Marriage

This issue raises three main questions: First, does the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) extend the right of marriage
to same-sex couples? Second, how should Article 23(2) of the ICCPR be
interpreted? Third, does customary international law require the United States
(U.S.) to recognize the right of same-sex couples to marry?
1. Does the ICCPR extend the right of marriage to same-sex couples?

Under the ICCPR, discrimination is barred on any ground including “race,
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.”6 While state parties are primarily responsible for
enforcement of the ICCPR, the Covenant also established the Human Rights
Committee (“HRCttee”) as a secondary enforcement mechanism that can be
utilized at the international level after all domestic remedies have been
exhausted. 7 Although HRCttee decisions do not constitute mandatory legal
judgments, the decisions resemble judicial decisions in format, and are

5

Corfu Channel Case (Merits) (Br. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
7
Id. art. 28.
6
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considered persuasive authority. Furthermore, the HRCttee is the authority for
interpreting the rights in the ICCPR.8
The HRCttee has not taken an entirely uniform approach in interpreting the
articles that are understood to address sexual orientation and same-sex marriage.
For instance, ICCPR Article 26 states that “all persons are equal before the
law . . . without any discrimination . . on any ground such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.” In Toonen v. Australia, the HRCttee held that “sexual
orientation” is included in the reference to “sex” in Article 26, effectively making
sexual orientation a protected class.9 In Young v. Australia, the HRCttee held that
Australia violated article 26 of the ICCPR by denying Young a pension on the
basis of his sex or sexual orientation. 10 In X v. Colombia, the HRCttee
similarly found that Colombia violated article 26 by failing to present a
reasonable and objective basis for distinguishing between unmarried
heterosexual couples and homosexual couples for the purpose of pension
benefits.11
Two members of the HRCttee joined in a separate dissenting opinion,
questioning the jurisprudence that reads sexual orientation as a protected class
under the ICCPR.12
ICCPR Article 23, on the other hand, specifically regards the right to
marry, and states that:
“the right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to
found a family shall be recognized.”13
The U.S. may argue that the inclusion of the term “men and women” in the
article is significant and limits the right of marriage to heterosexual marriages,
noting that the rest of the ICCPR uses more universal and gender neutral
terminology. This approach would find some support from Joslin v. New
Zealand, where the HRCttee held that “mere refusal to provide for marriage
between homosexual couples” does not violate the ICCPR.14 The HRCttee relied
in part on the assertion that the term “men and women” in Article 23(2)—rather
than gender neutral terms used elsewhere in the ICCPR—has been “consistently
and uniformly understood as indicating” heterosexual marriage. 15 Still, since
more and more countries are recognizing the right of same- sex couples to
marry, including Canada and parts of the U.S. and Mexico, the “consistent and
8
YOGESH TIYAGI, THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 51
(2011).
9
Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts Comm., 50th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992/ (1994).
10
Young v. Australia, Comm. No. 941/2000, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts Comm., 78th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (2003).
11
X v. Colombia, Comm. 1361/2005, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts Comm., 89th Sess., U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/89/D/1361/2005 (2007).
12
Id.
13
ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 23(2).
14
Joslin v New Zealand, Comm. No. 902/1999, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts Comm., 75th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999 (2002).
15
Id. para. 8.2.
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uniform understanding” of the meaning of article 23(2) discussed in Joslin may no
longer be valid.16
2. Interpreting the ICCPR

The question, then, is how Article 23(2) of the ICCPR is reconciled with the
broader context of the Covenant given the differing HRCttee approaches. Canada
may argue that decisions by the HRCttee are not broadly binding. Instead
Canada may propose interpreting the ICCPR by way of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), which guides interpretation to the “object and
purpose” of a treaty and requires analysis of text, context, and purpose. 17 VCLT
Art. 31(1) states that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose.” 18
The preamble of the ICCPR recognizes “the inherent dignity and . . . the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.” 19 Furthermore,
Article 26 of the ICCPR provides for the “equal protection” of “all persons.”20
Canada may use these provisions, along with the VCLT, to show that the ICCPR
should be interpreted so as to require the recognition of same-sex marriage.
Even if the U.S. were to concede that HRCtee decisions are not binding, it
may still argue lex specialis derogate legi generali (the lex specialis maxim) in
interpreting the ICCPR. The maxim gives precedence to the more specific law,
here Article 23(2) over the general law, Article 26, because the more specific law
is supposed to take better account of the context in which the law is to be
applied. 21 This would imply, then, that the ICCPR does not require the
recognition of same-sex marriage. The lex specialis maxim, however, is just one
of a number of interpretive tools to be used.22
3. Customary International Law

Canada may attempt to argue that customary international law recognizes
the rights of same-sex couples to be married. Customary international law is
binding, and a claim can be brought against a state to conform to custom even if
that state has qualms with a certain treaty provision. In order to show that a
norm has crystallized into customary international law, Canada must
demonstrate the existence of two elements: a widespread and consistent state
practice and opinio juris (belief that the practice is required by law). Evidence of
custom can be found, among other sources, in states conforming to treaties and
states reports to treaty bodies.
Sexual orientation and same-sex marriage are not explicitly mentioned in
any of the principal United Nations human rights instruments. There are,
16

Id. at para. 8.2.
VCLT, supra note 14, art. 31(1).
18
VCLT, supra note 1, art. 31(1).
19
ICCPR, supra note 6, preamble.
20
Id. at art. 26.
21
U.N. International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on
its Fifty-Eighth Session, 251(7), U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (Jan. 10, 2006).
22
Id. at 251(6).
17
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however, a number of human rights documents that, despite not explicitly
mentioning same-sex marriage, reveal custom to protect the right of same-sex
couples to marry if they so choose. For instance, Article 7 of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights (“UDHR”) affords universal equal protection: “All
are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law.”23 Article
12 of the UDHR recognizes the right to privacy: “No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence . . .
Everyone has the right to the protection of law against such interference.” 24
Finally, the right to marry is found in Article 16 of the UDHR: “Men and
women of full age . . . have the right to marry and to found a family.” 25 If
Canada can use these instruments to demonstrate a widespread practice and
opinion juris, it may be able to assert a new custom of international law.
The U.S., however, may argue that the use of gender specific terminology in
Article 16 limits the right to marriage to opposite sex couples. Furthermore, a
2011 report on discrimination against LGBT people from the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights repeated the holding from Joslin that same-sex
marriage is not an obligation of states.26
In addition, Canada may make reference to several recent U.N. General
Assembly resolutions indirectly supportive of LGBT rights.27 The United States
may point out that none of these have been adopted by a majority of the U.N.
membership, that a number of counter-resolutions have been put forward by
blocs of states opposed to LGBT rights, and that in any event, none of the
resolutions identify U.N. member states as obligated to provide same-sex
marriage.28 Canada may counter, in turn, that a 2008 French-Dutch Declaration
in the General Assembly expressing “concern at continued evidence in every
region of acts of violence and related human rights violations based on sexual
orientation and gender identity” has received support from 97 countries so far,
including in March 2009 from the U.S.29 In addition, within the U.N. human
23
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals based on
their sexual orientation and gender identity, Human Rights Council, 19th Sess., para. 68, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/19/41 (Nov. 17, 2011).
27
See for instance “Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions”, A/C.3/67/L.36 (9
Nov. 2012). In addition, in December 2010 the U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon,
delivered a landmark speech in which he called for the worldwide decriminalization of
homosexuality and for other measures to tackle violence and discrimination against LGBT
people. Since then, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has noted
that the core legal obligations of states with respect to the protection of human rights of LGBT
people include prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender
identity. Canada may argue that the inability of LGBT people to fully wed in all U.S. states is
in violation of this obligation.
28
The relevant resolutions condemn executions. They do not obligate countries to provide
a right of same-sex marriage.
29
See “Joint Statement on Ending Acts of Violence and Related Human Rights Violations
Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity”, presented to the U.N. General Assembly
Dec. 18, 2008.
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rights framework, countries that criminalize LGBT acts or do not recognize same
sex unions have been told to change their laws during the Universal Periodic
Review process. Several Special Rapporteurs commissioned by the HRCttee
have made statements supportive of LGBT rights in their reports.30
Canada may also attempt to argue that same-sex marriage, if not part of
customary international law, is emerging as an obligation in the regional custom
of North America. Canada and Mexico have legalized same-sex marriage, while
in 2013 the U.S. has repealed the discriminatory Defense of Marriage Act, and a
growing number of sub-federal jurisdictions are legalizing same-sex marriage
across the country. Still, it is arguable that, in order for regional custom to be
exist, there must be a common custom throughout the entire Americas.
Currently, only Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Mexico and the U.S, recognize
the right to same-sex marriage federally compared to dozens of countries that do
not, and North America has no common human rights framework. The U.S. may
point to these facts as evidence that no regional custom exists. Canada may
counter that in 2008 all 34 member countries of the Organization of American
States - including the U.S. - unanimously approved a declaration affirming that
human rights protections extend to sexual orientation and gender identity.31
B. OFAC’s Blocking of the Sale of The Oscar Wilde

The U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control blocked the sale of The Oscar
Wilde in order to prevent Chandra from making the ransom payment
demanded for Hayter’s release. The parties dispute the legality of the block.
This issue raises many questions about the definition of a “terrorist,” the scope
of “terrorism,” and the competing claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction.
1. Classifying Moses Andrew as a Pirate or Terrorist

When determining if the U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control’s (OFAC)
blockage on the sale of The Oscar Wilde violates international law, the first issue
to be addressed is whether Moses Andrew is a terrorist. The major argument of
both parties will likely focus on Moses Andrew’s motive for kidnapping Bill
Hayter. Traditionally, acts of piracy are recognized as being done for private
30

The HRCttee has held that States are not required, under international law, to allow
same-sex couples to marry. Yet, the obligation to protect individuals from discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation extends to ensuring that unmarried same-sex couples are treated
in the same way and entitled to the same benefits as unmarried opposite-sex couples. See
Young v. Australia, Comm. No. 941/2000, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts Comm., 78th Sess., U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000, para. 10.4 (2003). The HRCttee has welcomed measures to
address discrimination in this context. In its concluding observations on Ireland, the
Committee urged the State party to ensure that proposed Irish legislation establishing civil
partnerships not be “discriminatory of non-traditional forms of partnership, including taxation
and welfare benefits.” See “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on
Ireland”, CCPR/C/IRL/CO/3, para. 8 (July 22, 2008).
31
“Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity”, O.A.S. AG/RES. 2435
(XXXVIII-O/08) (2008) expressing concern about violence directed toward LGBT people in
the Americas and instructing the OAS’s Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs to
include the resolution on its agenda when addressing the U.N. General Assembly. The
document garnered support from Caribbean nations that criminalize homosexual acts.
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ends;32 they are based on pecuniary gain with no discernible political ends. On
the other hand, terrorism is motivated by political objectives that extend
past the immediate attack. 33 Determining the motivation for kidnapping Bill
Hayter and the likely purpose of the ransom money will be the key issue in
deciding if Moses Andrew is a terrorist.
According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) Article 101, piracy is defined as “illegal acts . . . committed for
private ends . . . and directed . . . against another ship.”34 The key part of the
definition that Canada will most likely focus on is that the act was done for
“private ends,” a key distinction from most definitions of terrorism, which are
viewed as acts done for political reasons.35 Private ends are generally understood
to mean stealing money, cargo, and vessels for self-enrichment. 36 A United
States court, however, recently reviewed the definition of “private ends” in
relation to piracy and concluded that private ends included actions undertaken on
“personal, moral, or philosophical grounds.” 37 The court also noted that the
perpetrators may consider their acts to be serving the public good, but this does
not automatically mean that the ends are public.38 Canada will most likely argue
that the kidnapping of Bill Hayter was done for the ransom payment and is thus
an act of piracy, not terrorism.
The U.S. will argue that Moses Andrew is in fact a terrorist, and the
kidnapping of Bill Hayter was an act of terrorism. There is no internationally
comprehensive or accepted definition of terrorism. 39 The UN describes
terrorism as, “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in
the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political
purposes.”40 The Canadian Criminal Code defines acts of terrorism as acts done
“in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or
cause. 41 Finally, the United States Code defines terrorism as “premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents . . . .”42 All three of these definitions state
that terrorist acts are done for a political purpose.
Moses Andrew identified himself as a member of the NLF in his ransom
email, and indicated that Bill Hayter was being held by NLF guerillas. The goal
of the NLF is political, and thus the U.S. may argue that the kidnapping of Bill
Hayter and ransom demand are politically motivated. The NLF has been
32

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), art. 101, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; Geneva Convention on the High Seas, art.
15, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
33
Tina Garmon, International Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piracy and
Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 257, 258 (2002-2003).
34
UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 101.
35
Garmon, supra note 33, at 258.
36
Id. at 146.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Garmon, supra note 33, at 269.
40
G.A. Res. 49/60, para. 31, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/60 (Dec. 9, 1994).
41
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s 83.01(1) (Can.).
42
22 U.S.C.A. § 2656f (d)(2) (West 2004).
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designated as a terrorist organization on lists maintained by Public Safety
Canada and the U.S. State Department.43 Finally, the U.S. could argue that the
motive for the attack was not a simple financial gain, but a financial gain that
will fund the ultimate goal of liberating the Namian Islands—the political goal
of the NLF. Therefore, the kidnapping was an act of terrorism, not piracy. Still,
there is no direct evidence that the payment, if made, would end up in the hands
of terrorists, a point Canada is likely to emphasize.
2. Does the projected ransom payment to the NLF constitute terrorist financing
under international law?

The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (“Terrorism Financing Convention”) aims to avert terrorist activities by
targeting financial sources; it criminalizes providing money to support terrorist
groups and activities and requires signatories to prosecute or extradite such
offenders. 44 Under Art. 2(1)(a), any act that constitutes an offence in the
Convention’s nine annexed treaties is an act of terrorism.45 However, Art. 2(1)(b)
states that acts other than the ones in Art. 2(1)(a) that may be covered by the
Convention, but only if those acts “intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury” with the purpose to “compel a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”46
Canada will likely argue that the Terrorism Financing Convention annexes
do not include piracy. Thus, if the Convention does not define piracy as
terrorism in one of its annexes, then financing piracy would only be a violation if
it satisfies Art. 2(1)(b)’s requirements. As discussed above, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Art. 101 defines piracy as an as
any illegal act “of violence or detention . . . committed for private ends” against
another vessel while on the high seas or in a country’s territorial waters.47 This
conflicts with the text of Art. 2(1)(b) under which acts of terrorism must have a
political, rather than private, motive. 48 Under the UNCLOS definition, piracy
would not satisfy Art. 2(1)(b)’s requirements, and financing piracy would not be a
violation of the Terrorism Financing Convention.
The United States, however, may counter that the Convention does include
piracy in its terms. First, although Art. 2(1)(b) seems to eliminate piracy, Art.
2(1)(a), and the treaties it references, could be read to incorporate such private acts
of terrorism as piracy. 49 The International Convention Against the Taking of
43

Id.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Oct. 30,
2013, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter ICSFT]. As of 2013, 132 countries have signed the
Convention, including Canada and the United States. See also Pierre Klein, International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (2009),
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/icsft/icsft_e.pdf.
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Id. at art. 2(1)(a).
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Id. at art. 2(1)(b).
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UNCLOS, supra note 32, art. 101.
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ICSFT, supra note 44, art. 2(1)(b).
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Andreas Kolb et al., Paying Danegeld to Pirates—Humanitarian Necessity or
Financing Jihadists, 15 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. LAW 105, 129 (2011) [hereinafter Kolb].
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Hostages, from 1979, and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, referenced by the Terrorism
Financing Convention, both apply to piracy, a private act. 50 Using this view,
Art. 2(1)(a) could arguably include piracy as a terrorist act.
The United States may also claim that paying the ransom is illegal under
Art. 2 because the money could be used to fund further terrorism activity. Art
2(1) makes it a crime to, directly or indirectly, provide any funds with the intent
to further terrorism activity. 51 Selling The Oscar Wilde and using the money for
the ransom payment could give the NLF the necessary financing to continue its
illegal actions. This could promote further kidnappings and piracy that, under
the Convention, are terrorist-type activities.
Even if the Terrorism Financing Convention does include piracy as an act of
terrorism, paying ransoms for the release of hostages may not actually be an
offence under the Convention. To violate Art. 2, not only must the financing go
to an act defined in Art. 2(1(a)-(b), the payments must also be “unlawfully”
provided or collected.52 If paying ransom to safely recover hostages constitutes a
legal practice, then such payment would not be “unlawfully provided.”
A 2010 African Union report proposing new measures to combat terrorism
included a section that recommended a prohibition on ransom payments to
terrorist groups, and “requested the international community to consider the
payment of ransom to terrorist groups as a crime.” 53
This proposal could be taken to infer that the payment of a ransom is not a
violation of the Convention. The Swiss Legislature, when adapting to the
Convention, found even ransom payments that may fund terrorism could be
justified. 54 In Britain, sec. 15 of the Terrorism Act 2000 criminalizes fundraising for terrorist organizations. 55 However, in Masefield AG v. Amlin
Corporate Member Ltd., the Court ruled that no legislation existed which
criminalized ransom payments. 56 The Court also held that, since ransom
payments can be recovered as “sue and labour expenses . . . it cannot be against
public policy . . . to pay a ransom.” 57 In Germany, paying a ransom may
violate Section 129(a) of the Criminal Code, which deals with terrorist
organizations. 58 However, German citizens have been ransomed from pirates,
suggesting that, when lives are at stake, ransom payments are allowable.59 Even
50
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Id. at art. 2.
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and Security Council Doc. PSC/PR/2 (CCXLIX) 7 (Nov 22, 2010).
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Kolb, supra note 49, at 136.
55
The Terrorism Act 2000, 2000, c. 3, §15.
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the United States seems to support the idea that ransom payments are legal. In
Peters v. Warren Ins. Co., the United States Supreme Court held that ransom is a
“necessary means of deliverance from a peril insured against, and acting directly
upon the property.”60 These instances, along with the 2010 African Union report,
could support Canada’s argument that ransom payments are not unlawful.
The United States, however, may counter that, under U.S. law, the ransom
payment is illegal. United States Executive Order 13536, implemented by
President Barack Obama in April 2010, criminalizes any monetary contributions,
including ransoms, to Somali pirates and those connected to the pirates.61 Since
evidence suggests the NLF is connected to Somali pirates, paying the ransom
to the NLF would violate the Executive Order.
The ransom payment might also violate United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1373, which came into force in 2001, before the Convention. 62
Resolution 1373 was enacted soon after September 11, 2001, as a way of
imposing uniform norms on all U.N. members. 63 Like the Convention, the
Resolution prohibits funding terrorist groups and imposes an obligation to prevent
such financing on states.64 Unlike the Convention, however, the Resolution is
mandatory for all U.N. members, not just signatories.65
Canada may argue that the Convention, adopted in 1999, is simply restated
in Res. 1373. The Resolution was created to cover many of the same issues as
the Convention, and was in part based on the Convention.66
3. Does the Law of the Flag or the Law of the Jurisdiction in Which a Vessel is
Located Prevail in the Event of a Conflict?

According to the UNCLOS Art. 91(1), ships have the nationality of the
State whose flag they fly. 67 Thus, the term “flag State” refers to the State
whose nationality a ship bears.68 Here, The Oscar Wilde was flagged as a U.S.
vessel. Generally, the nationality of a ship has three functions: it indicates (a)
which State is permitted under international law to exercise its jurisdiction and
control over the vessel; (b) which State is obliged to implement the duties listed
in Art. 94 of UNCLOS and enforce national and international safety, labor, and
environmental protection standards; and (c) which State is entitled to extend
diplomatic protection to the vessel and its crew. Thus it is usually the flag state
that is entitled to assert jurisdiction over its vessels.
“Port state jurisdiction” refers to a legal relationship between the vessel and
the sovereign territory in which the vessel is located, where the flag State is
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different than the port State.69 On the basis of its territorial sovereignty, the port
State may regulate the conditions for the access to and the stay of foreign vessels
in its ports. Here, The Oscar Wilde was moored in Canadian territory, giving
Canada port state jurisdiction. When the flag state and port state differ, as is the
case here, competing claims for jurisdiction arise. The issue, then, is which
jurisdiction prevails in the event of such a conflict.
Canada asserts that the OFAC freeze is a violation of its rights as a port state
to control chattels in its territory. UNCLOS recognizes that a state’s sovereignty
extends to its territorial sea, and includes the ability to exercise full jurisdiction
therein. UNCLOS Art. 2(1) states that the “sovereignty of a coastal State
extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an
archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as
the territorial sea.”70
The Oscar Wilde is within this territory described — it is moored in
Vancouver — and, Canada will argue, is therefore subject to the sovereign
control of Canada. “By entering a foreign port or foreign internal waters,
a . . . ship and its crew comes temporarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the
port State; it becomes subject to the laws and enforcement powers of that
state.”71 As such, the vessel is subject to the laws of Canada. Furthermore, while
The Oscar Wilde does fly the flag of the U.S., its only active owner resides within
Canada and is a Canadian citizen. As such, he is entitled to place his own
property up for sale, so long as this sale does not violate Canadian or
international law. As per the Canadian Diplomatic Note issued to the United
States, “the actions of OFAC were unwarranted in this instance since ‘the
payment of a ransom is not contrary to international law.” 72 This statement
seems to suggest that, in addition to being legal under international law, the
sale of The Oscar Wilde is regarded as legal according to Canadian law.
Therefore, the OFAC’s blocking of the sale of The Oscar Wilde is ineffective as
it violates Canada’s ability to control chattels within its sovereign territory.
The exercise of port State jurisdiction, however, is not absolute. A distinction
must be made with regard to the effects the activities on board the foreign vessel
have on the port state’s territory or interests. 73 It is generally accepted that
activities that affect coastal interests are subject to port State jurisdiction.74 The
U.S. may argue that the abduction itself occurred in international waters. It would
then follow that the flag State has jurisdiction over the vessel, as no port State can
be said to have jurisdiction while the vessel is in international waters. 75 In
addition, Canada and the U.S. both have a coastal interest in preventing
69
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abductions off their respective coasts. Since the exact location of the abduction is
unknown, both countries may have equally viable recourse with regard to coastal
interest. The U.S. may emphasize this equality by pointing to the fact that it was
a U.S. citizen, Bill Hayter, that was abducted.
Furthermore, the U.S. may argue that it had the right to freeze the sale based
on the text of the U.N. Charter itself. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter provides
that: “In the event of a conflict between the Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”76 The OFAC
Freeze was made pursuant to United Nations Security Council Res. 1373, which
condemns terrorism financing. This Resolution was made under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter and is binding on all U.N. member states. Accordingly, the
U.S. will likely argue that, if completed, the sale of The Oscar Wilde would be
used for the express purpose of paying ransom. This ransom would be paid to a
member of a terrorist organization and thus finance future terrorist acts, a
violation of Security Council Res. 1373. Because adhering to Res. 1373 conflicts
with Canada’s assertion of port state jurisdiction and sovereignty under
UNCLOS Art. 2, the U.S. will argue that obligations under Res. 1373 should
prevail.
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U.N. Charter art. 103.

